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  11. INTRODUCTION 
 
After almost six years of exceptional performance, the world economy has 
now entered a period of uncertainty due to a financial turmoil triggered by the 
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States.  World economic growth and stability 
in the next few years will depend crucially on the impact of the crisis on the United 
States economy and its global spillovers.  The resilience of emerging markets to direct 
and indirect shocks from the crisis will no doubt play an important role, since much of 
global growth in recent years has been due to expansion in these economies, notably 
in Asia.  The extent to which growth and stability in Asian emerging markets can be 
decoupled crucially depends on prevailing domestic economic conditions as well as 
the policy response to possible shocks from the crisis.   
    
This paper takes up these issues.  The following section posits the main theme 
of the paper that current difficulties in the United States economy and vulnerabilities 
in emerging markets are not unrelated to financial excesses that made a major 
contribution to global expansion in the past six years, including credit, asset and 
investment bubbles triggered by rapid expansion of global liquidity.   
 
Section 3 takes up the causes, nature and the severity of the crisis in the United 
States and the policy response already under way, with a view to assessing their 
possible effects on growth and external adjustment.  The role that regulatory 
shortcomings have played in the subprime crisis is examined in some detail because it 
provides useful lessons for emerging markets where such shortcomings are often seen 
as the root cause of crises. 
 
This is followed in section 4 by a discussion of key aspects of prevailing 
economic conditions in major Asian developing economies affecting their 
vulnerability to financial shocks from the crisis, examining the extent to which they 
have been successful in managing the surge in capital inflows and preventing the 
emergence of fragility and imbalances, drawing on the lessons from the 1997 crisis.  
Greater attention is paid to China and India since these two countries together account 
for about four-fifths of the total output and two-thirds of the total trade of developing 
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linkages in East and South East Asia.   
 
Section 5 looks at possible trade and financial effects of the crisis on Asian 
developing economies; makes an assessment of mainstream projections and scenarios; 
and discusses policy challenges and options.  It is argued that the larger economies of 
the region, China and India, have fragility and imbalances which could be laid bare by 
shocks from the subprime crisis.  However, in general, countries with strong fiscal 
and balance-of-payments positions, including China and several East and South East 
Asian countries, have adequate policy space to respond positively to shocks from the 
crisis.  But others, including India, may face difficulties if the crisis leads to a reversal 
of direction of capital flows − an outcome which is not likely but which cannot be 
ruled out.  There is a need to secure intra-regional consistency in policy response, 
notably with respect to expansionary macroeconomic policies and currency 
adjustments.  Consideration could also be given to establishing mechanisms for 
regional exchange rate cooperation on a more durable basis.   
 
 
2.  THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN THE RECENT GLOBAL EXPANSION 
 
To many observers the sudden turnaround in world economic prospects has 
come as a surprise in view of the strength and persistence of economic growth and 
stability since the early years of the decade.  From 2002 until the end of 2007 world 
economic growth averaged 4.5 per cent per annum compared to 3 per cent in the 
1990s.  Growth has been particularly strong and broad-based in the developing world, 
reaching some 7.5 per cent, twice the rate of the 1990s.  Real commodity prices rose 
to levels not seen since the 1970s and developing countries as a whole started to run 
trade surpluses with advanced countries thanks to the strong export performance of 
China and trade surpluses of fuel exporters.  After a short interruption in the early 
years of the millennium, private capital flows to developing countries recovered 
strongly and spreads on emerging-market debt fell to historical lows.  Price stability in 
the developing world has been unprecedented for many decades, with single-digit 
inflation rates being the rule rather than the exception.  There has been no major 
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markets with large and widening current account deficits.  
 
Current economic difficulties and vulnerabilities, however, are not unrelated to 
forces driving this expansion.  As a result of continued deregulation of financial 
markets and further opening of national borders to international capital flows, 
economic activity in both advanced and developing countries has come to be 
increasingly shaped by financial factors.  The pro-cyclical behaviour of financial 
markets tends to reinforce expansionary and contractionary forces, amplifying the 
swings in investment, output and employment.
1  Risks are often underestimated at 
times of expansion, giving rise to a rapid credit growth, asset price inflation, over-
indebtedness and excessive spending, and adding to growth momentum.  However, 
these also produce financial fragility which is exposed with a cyclical downturn in 
economic activity and/or increased cost of borrowing when incomes can no longer 
service the debt incurred, giving rise to defaults, credit crunch, asset price deflation 
and economic contraction − the kind of difficulties that the United States economy is 
now facing.     
 
From the early years of the decade the world economy went through a period 
of easy money as policy interest rates in major industrial countries, notably the United 
States and Japan, were brought down to historically low levels and international 
liquidity expanded rapidly.
2  These, together with stagnant equity prices in most 
mature markets, led to a search-for-yield by creditors and investors.  In the United 
States ample liquidity and low interest rates, together with regulatory shortcomings, 
resulted in a rapid growth of speculative lending and a bubble in the property markets, 
providing a major stimulus to growth, but also sowing the seeds of current difficulties.  
Low interest rates in some other advanced countries, notably in Japan, encouraged 
                                                 
1  This is the essence of the financial instability hypothesis developed by Minsky (1978) following in 
the footsteps of Fisher and Keynes.  Minsky starts from the proposition that stability (tranquility), 
including that of an expansion, is destabilizing since it increases confidence, reduces the value placed 
on liquidity and raises the acceptable debt-to-equity ratios.  He sees financial instability as an intrinsic 
feature of market economies and financial fragility as endogenous.  For a discussion of the relevance of 
this analysis to boom-bust cycles in emerging markets, see Akyüz (2008).  
2  See IMF (2007c) for the notion of global liquidity and the role of monetary policy in advanced 
economies and financial innovation in global liquidity expansion and risk appetite.  See also BIS 
(2007a: 8-10) for a similar discussion. 
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form of highly leveraged carry trades.  The very same factors have played a major 
role in the strong recovery of capital flows to emerging markets, contributing to 
currency appreciations, asset bubbles and credit expansion, and stimulating spending 
and growth in the recipient countries.  The credit crunch unleashed by the bursting of 
the subprime bubble and its global spillovers now threatens to reverse this process and 
produce a sharp slowdown in global growth.  
 
 
3.  EXPANSION AND CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
a.  The subprime boom and bust 
 
Since the 1980s the United States economy has been increasingly driven by 
financial boom-bust cycles.  Economic expansions are generally accentuated by credit 
and asset bubbles which eventually lead to credit crunch and debt deflation, and 
threaten to push the economy into a deep and long recession.  Monetary policy largely 
ignores financial excesses at times of expansion, but tends to be deployed rapidly 
when the bubbles burst, and in doing so prepares the ground for the next bubble.   
 
The United States economy had entered the 1990s with a recession deepened 
by a banking and real estate crisis produced by a combination of financial 
deregulation and deposit insurance in the previous decade.  The response was a sharp 
reduction in policy interest rates to allow debtors to refinance debt at substantially 
lower rates and banks to build up capital by riding the yield curve − that is, by   
borrowing short-term and investing in higher-yielding medium-term government 
securities.
3  This, together with advances in information technology, created the dot-
com bubble in the second half of the 1990s.  The Federal Reserve refrained from 
applying the brakes even though its chairman recognized that the United States 
economy was suffering from "irrational exuberance" as the stock market, led by the 
information sector, was booming.  But when the bubble burst in the early 2000s, it 
                                                 
3  On financial deregulation, banking and real estate crisis in the United States in the 1980s and the 
policy response in the early 1990s, see UNCTAD TDR (1991; 1994; and 1997). 
  5came to the rescue, bringing policy interest rates to historical lows and expanding 
liquidity rapidly for fear of a credit crunch and asset deflation throwing the economy 
into a deep recession. 
 
This, together with the continued deregulation of the financial system, resulted 
in another bubble, this time in the real estate market supported by subprime mortgage 
lending.  Despite warnings, the Fed ignored the bubble and refrained from using 
monetary instruments and the regulatory authority it had been granted to stem 
speculative lending.
4  But, again, it has responded rapidly to the subprime crisis by 
large cuts in interest rates and massive expansion of liquidity, raising concerns that 
the United States economy may be poised to go through yet another boom-bust cycle. 
 
A brief examination of the role that regulatory shortcomings have played in 
these boom-bust cycles helps reveal the nature and origin of the present crisis and 
produce valuable policy lessons.  During the past few decades the banking industry in 
the United States and most other advanced countries has been losing its relative 
position in the financial sector as deposits became a less important source of funds for 
financial intermediaries.  Furthermore, the margin between credit and deposit rates 
has been falling because of growing competition from non-bank financial 
intermediaries.  In the United States the pressure on bank profits intensified during the 
1980s with the removal of control over deposit rates, losing the banks the cost 
advantage at a time when accelerated growth of markets for commercial papers and 
junk bonds and increased securitization of assets put pressure on lending rates.
5   
 
The response was twofold.  First, banks increasingly went into new, riskier 
areas of lending, notably for commercial and residential property and leveraged 
takeovers and buyouts.  Second, they expanded their fee-based, off-balance-sheet 
activities in the capital market through subsidiaries and affiliates.  Simultaneously, 
securities firms and insurance companies started engaging in traditional banking 
                                                 
4 On the reluctance of the Fed to use the direction and authority given in 1994 to clamp down on 
dangerous and predatory lending practices, see Kuttner (2007).  
5 On the decline of traditional banking and earlier response, see Kaufman and Mote (1994) and 
Edwards and Mishkin (1995). 
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increasingly important in the credit market, without, however, having access to 
insured deposits or being subject to conventional prudential restraints.  These 
developments have strengthened the link between credit and asset markets whereby 
credit expansion has increasingly resulted in asset bubbles which have, in turn, 
provided the basis on which credit could grow thanks to the practice of mark-to-
market valuation of assets.  
 
Regulatory policies have not been adapted to this new financial environment 
even though there was considerable awareness of the risks involved.
6  Rather, the 
authorities submitted to pressures for further deregulation.  Until recently, in the 
United States the banks’ off-balance-sheet activities in non-traditional areas through 
affiliates and subsidiaries were subject to specific limits.  In 1999, however, new 
legislation effectively demolished the firewalls between commercial banking and 
investment banking by allowing the former to expand into capital market activities 
and the latter to enter more deeply into the territory of traditional commercial banking 
− a step which has played a major role in the subprime boom-bust cycle.
7  
 
The new legislation allowed the banks to join mortgage companies and rapidly 
expand high-risk mortgage lending as well as credit card and car loans, and move 
them off their balance sheets through securitization.  In search for yield in conditions 
of exceptionally low interest rates, many banks enticed households into taking up so-
called “teaser loans” in very much the same way they had done in Asia in the run-up 
to the 1997 crisis; that is, loans for which a borrower is qualified “based on an 
artificially low initial interest rate, even though he or she doesn't have sufficient 
income to make the monthly payments when the interest rate is reset in two years” 
(Pearlstein 2007).  They then put them into packages of mortgage-backed securities as 
collateralized debt obligations and sold these in the capital market with the help of 
                                                 
6  This was clearly stated by one of the present members of the Federal Reserve Board in a co-authored 
article in 1995: “The decline of traditional banking entails a risk to the financial system only if 
regulators fail to adapt their policies to the new financial environment that is emerging” (Edwards and 
Mishkin 1995: 42).  
7  In the new legislation depository institutions are permitted to own other financial institutions or to be 
affiliated with them through financial holding companies.  On the role of deregulation, notably the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, in the subprime crisis, see Kregel (2007) and Kuttner (2007). 
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and commissions.  The special investment vehicles (SIVs) created for this purpose 
have acquired large amounts of securitized higher-yielding long-term loans with funds 
raised by issuing short-term commercial paper, often with the support of their 
sponsoring banks.
8
   
As banks’ profits from these non-traditional activities were boosted, there 
were strong incentives to expand such loans.  This sustained the growth in demand for 
housing which, in turn, kept prices rising, thereby validating the underlying credit 
expansion.  It also provided a strong stimulus to investment in housing construction, 
which became a main driving force of expansion: during 2002-06 real residential 
private investment increased by almost one-third while non-residential fixed capital 
formation rose by a mere 4 per cent (OECD 2007: annex tables 6-7).  However, as the 
housing market was satiated, prices levelled off and policy interest rates were raised, 
there was a sharp increase in foreclosures in the course of 2006, leading to declines in 
house prices, bursting the bubble.
9  The market for mortgage-based securities has 
totally seized up, as has the market for commercial paper issued by SIVs to fund 
securitized loans.  Many of these securities have now been downgraded from triple-A 
ratings to the class of junk bonds.   
 
High-risk financial operations concerning subprime lending, securitization and 
investment are not confined to the United States.  Many of the banks involved are 
global banks operating in several mature and emerging markets.  Banks in major 
European countries have been involved directly or indirectly by issuing or holding 
securitized subprime assets and running or sponsoring SIVs.  The United Kingdom 
experienced a similar subprime bubble leading to serious difficulties in certain 
financial institutions, of which Northern Rock is the most prominent.  Several German 
                                                 
8  SIVs are like banks in respect of maturity transformation between long-term assets and short-term 
liabilities, but unlike banks they are not regulated; nor do they have access to lender-of-last-resort 
financing.  They are thus exposed to liquidity risk.  Their solvency can also be threatened if the value 
of their assets falls below that of their liabilities as a result of short-term interest rate hikes or default on 
their assets, as is now happening with mortgage-backed securities. 
9 The underlying assumption that the spread between short and long rates would remain stable or widen 
failed to materialize as the yield curve flattened with increases in policy rates after 2004, slowing the 
demand for mortgage-based securities and squeezing SIVs.  
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subprime operations.  Losses from the crisis are now generally recognized to be at 
least $1 trillion.       
 
The mortgage-based securities have been marketed globally, in both mature 
and emerging economies, acquired by hedge funds, insurance companies, pension 
funds, foundations, non-financial firms and individuals so that the impact is felt more 
generally, across several sectors and even in countries which were not among the 
originators of such lending.
10  An important part of them was guaranteed by bond 
insurers, the so-called monolines, which joined the spree to benefit from the housing 
boom  − something that is particularly revealing about the opaque nature of the 
operations, since bond insurers are expected to be in a better position to assess the 
risks involved.  These insurers lack necessary capital to cover the losses on defaulted 
securities and they have now started losing their credit ratings, with attendant 
consequences for bond ratings and values in other segments of the market.
11  
 
b.  The policy response and prospects  
 
The subprime bubble has left the United States economy with excessive 
residential investment which cannot be put into full use without significant declines in 
house prices.  The household sector has ended up with debt in excess of equity 
represented by such investment.  An important part of portfolios of banks and their 
affiliates is not performing.  Bond insurers are faced with massive obligations they 
can no longer fulfil.  And many investors across the world have found themselves 
holding worthless mortgage-based securities and commercial paper.   
                                                 
10  The Bank of China is reported to have lost some $2 billion on its holdings of collateralized 
securities, including those backed by United States mortgages (Pearlstein 2008).  Standard Chartered, 
in which Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, Temasek, owns a 19 per cent stake, is reported to have 
been walking away from its $7.5 billion SIVs sold in Asia and the Middle East (Bowring 2008b). 
11 Monolines are bond insurers which guarantee repayment of principal and interest in case of default 
of the issuer.  They are so named because originally they were engaged in a single line of business − 
namely, insuring municipal bonds.  The triple-A credit rating they enjoy is passed on to any bond they 
insure so that downgrading will affect the ratings and values of all the bonds insured by monolines. 
Banks are now reported to own some $850 billion of securities guaranteed by bond insurers, and the 
failure of monolines to pay out the principals and interest on insured bonds would require additional 
funds for banks, estimated in the order of some $150 billion. 
  9There is considerable uncertainty over whether the United States economy will 
succumb to this debt crisis brought on by years of profligate lending or be able to 
restore growth after a brief interruption.  The evolution of economic activity will no 
doubt depend on the impact of the crisis on private spending.  This will, in turn, 
depend on the ability and willingness of banks to provide adequate financing on 
appropriate terms and conditions, and of households and firms to expand consumption 
and investment.  
 
In recognition of these two aspects of the problem, policy makers in the 
United States have responded to mitigate the difficulties in the financial system by 
large cuts in interest rates and provision of ample liquidity, and to support aggregate 
spending and incomes through a fiscal package.
12  Monetary easing is certainly 
helpful, but cannot fully resolve the difficulties the United States financial system is 
currently facing since this is, in essence, a solvency crisis.  Lower policy rates and 
ample liquidity can help banks to gradually build up capital by riding the yield curve, 
but they cannot address the immediate problem of depleted capital.   Beyond the 
arbitrage between the Fed and the Treasury, banks’ ability to build up capital rapidly 
by investing in higher-yielding private securities is limited because, on current 
regulatory practices, this would necessitate spare capital in the first place.  
 
The bailout provided by the Big Bank is thus incomplete even though the Fed 
has now gone further, accepting mortgage-based securities as collateral and lending 
directly to major investment banks. A more effective solution would be outright 
nationalization of non-performing private debt.
13  This is what many governments in 
emerging  markets  hit  by financial crises in recent years were forced to do, including 
 
 
                                                 
12 This is very much in line with what Minsky (1986) proposed to resolve such crises and prevent deep 
and prolonged recessions − that is, a Big Bank as a lender of last resort, and a Big Government as a 
spender of last resort − even though their effectiveness at the present juncture is contentious. 
13 A recent proposal by a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Feldstein (2008),  
comes close − that is, the federal government should lend each mortgage holder 20 per cent of the 
value of the mortgage with a 15-year payback period at the rates on two-year Treasury debt. 
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14  However, such a  
solution would not only create moral hazard, but also sustain misalignments in asset 
prices, postponing the problems, possibly to come back with greater force.
15
 
An alternative solution would be fire-sale foreign direct investment (FDI), as 
practised during the Asian crisis when collapse of currencies and asset prices created 
ample opportunities for foreigners to grab assets at drastically reduced prices 
(Krugman 1998).  Many of the troubled banks have indeed been seeking injection of 
new capital from abroad, mostly from sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in emerging 
markets, including China, Singapore and fuel exporters in the Gulf.  So far the amount 
raised seems to be in the order of $40 billion, well below the capital losses (Gieve 
2008).  Misgivings about investment by SWFs from emerging markets, often 
considered as cross-border nationalization, have been put aside for the time being, but 
there are reasons for SWFs to become more cautious not only because the shares 
acquired do not always allow control and voting rights, but also because of large 
losses on their investments.
16    
  
The ability of the United States to continue lowering policy interest rates is 
circumscribed by the willingness of the rest of the world to absorb the excess liquidity 
since the dollar is an international currency.  Continued depreciation of the dollar vis-
à-vis the euro would hurt fragile growth in Europe while sharp declines against Asian 
currencies can generate strong inflationary pressures in the United States, creating 
serious dilemmas for monetary policy.  A rise in long-term rates on expectations of 
higher inflation would not help growth even if it could support banks by steepening 
                                                 
14 The assumption of private sector liabilities through recapitalization of insolvent banks in financial 
crises has made a significant contribution to growth of public debt in emerging markets.  In Indonesia, 
these raised public debt by more than 50 per cent of GDP (IMF 2003: 28n), creating problems of fiscal 
sustainability despite a good track record.  For Thailand and Korea corresponding figures are 42 per 
cent and 34 per cent respectively (Hoggard and Saporta 2001: 162). 
15 It is notable that warnings are coming from some financial market participants that bailouts would 
prevent the much-needed correction in asset prices and compound the problems − Roach (2007). 
16 See Weisman (2007).  Several commentators including Summers (2007b) and Truman (2007a) call 
for greater transparency and accountability − something visibly missing in the case of western 
institutional investors and hedge funds.  Others such as Wade (2007) see SWFs as “a partial redress to 
the unlevel playing field built into ‘global system’ through a panoply of international rules … which 
confer structural advantages on western companies.”    
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exports to Asia without importing inflation is unrealistic.  For the first time in the 
post-war era the United States may be seriously challenged in its ability to conduct 
independent monetary policy to the neglect of its external ramifications. 
 
While loss of bank capital is likely to sustain tight credit conditions, even 
availability of credit at drastically reduced rates might not give a sufficient boost to 
household spending to reignite the economy, given the excessive levels of debt 
inherited from the two successive bubbles since the early 1990s.  The debt 
accumulation has gone hand in hand with the expansion of private consumption ahead 
of disposable income, resulting in a drastic decline in household savings.  While 
household savings reached 7.7 per cent of disposable income in the early 1990s, they 
dropped to some 2 per cent at the end of the decade and continued to fall in the new 
millennium during the housing bubble, disappearing altogether in the past two years.  
The household debt/income ratio now stands at around 140 per cent compared to less 
than 90 per cent in the early 1990s.  There has been a rapid growth in mortgage debt 
since the beginning of the 2000s, which now exceeds disposable income (Table 1).   
 
There is strong evidence that asset bubbles have played a major role in the 
decline of household savings and increased indebtedness.  The dot-com bubble of the 
1990s generated a strong wealth effect on private consumption because of increased 
household stock holding and greater access to credit.  During the past two decades 
there has been a rapid increase in the share of households in stocks owned directly or 
through mutual funds, which has now reached 50 per cent.  On the other hand, 
financial deregulation has improved the access of households to credit, loosening the 
traditional budget (liquidity) constraint on consumption spending.
17  These account 
for the finding that the acceleration in the decline in the personal savings rate in the 
United States after 1994 was due to an increase in the propensity to consume of 
families whose portfolios benefited most from exceptional capital gains from the dot-
com bubble (Maki and Palumbo 2001).  This process was sustained by capital gains 
from rising house prices in the 2000s, as households increasingly extracted equity 
from the value of their houses to finance consumption.  The mark-to-market practice 
                                                 
17 See Debelle (2004) who also mentions low interest rates among the reasons for increased household 
indebtedness.  
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for credit expansion.   
 
With the decline in house prices many households now face negative equity 
and banks inadequate collateral for their outstanding claims.  While household debt 
was around 18 per cent of household net worth in the early 1990s, this went up to 24 
per cent in 2006.   It is expected to increase further as household net worth falls as a 
result of continued declines in house prices as well as in stocks, which appear to be 
strongly correlated with the housing market.
18  According to the flow-of-funds figures 
released by the Fed in March 2008, the net worth of American households dropped 
during the last quarter of 2007 for the first time since 2002.  
 
The decline in savings and increased indebtedness of households is mirrored 
by growing external deficits of the United States.  While the current account was 
almost balanced in the early 1990s, it is now in deficit by over 6 per cent of GDP, 
reflecting a greater savings gap.  Since about 70 per cent of the GDP is due to 
consumer spending, the deterioration in the current account is almost fully accounted 
for by the decline in personal savings.
19  In other words, asset bubbles have made a 
significant contribution to the widening of the national savings gap and the external 
deficit in the United States since the early 1990s.  Consequently, any adjustment in 
household savings and indebtedness necessitated by the current process of asset 
deflation will have significant implications for the United States’ external balances. 
 
A sizeable decline in consumer spending now appears inevitable, leading to a 
sharp drop in growth.  The fiscal package of some $170 billion introduced looks too 
small compared to the scale of the problem.  Two-thirds of this stimulus is in tax 
rebates to consumers.  It is difficult to predict how much of these would be translated 
into consumer spending rather than used for debt payments, but the amount to be 
                                                 
18 Van Eeden (2006) shows that the S&P 500 stock index closely follows a forward-looking Housing 
Market Index with a one-year lag.     
19  A decline in the personal savings rate by 7 percentage points of disposable income corresponds to a 
5 per cent decline in terms of GDP.  The much-publicized fiscal deficits have had very little to do with 
this deterioration − before the dot-com bubble fiscal deficits were in the order of 5 per cent of GDP 
compared to some 3 per cent in recent years. 
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decline in consumer spending that would result from the drop in house prices, which 
could lead to a loss of wealth as much as $6 trillion.  Even on conservative estimates 
relating wealth to consumption, this could reduce consumer spending by $200-$400 
billion (Roubini 2008; Weisbrot 2008). 
 
Not only would the crisis produce a large cut in household consumption, but 
any subsequent recovery may also see a reduced propensity to consume since balance-
sheet restructuring is a protracted process.  In fact, United States recessions and 
recoveries following asset-bubble-driven expansions in the early 1990s and 2000s 
were generally associated with very weak spending in sectors with debt overhang.  
This was particularly the case during the recovery from the recession triggered by the 
dot-com bubble.  Not only did non-residential private investment drop considerably 
during the brief recession in 2001, but the recovery that followed was the weakest in 
terms of investment since 1949.  The corporations which had over-borrowed during 
the dot-com bubble were highly exposed to asset price declines during the recession.  
Efforts were directed in the subsequent recovery towards restoring the health of 
balance sheets.  Thus, increased incomes were used for reducing debt rather than 
expansion of production capacity and employment.  Industries that attracted too much 
investment during the boom were “paying it back” by reducing their workforce and 
structurally declining (Groshen and Potter 2003). 
   
Certainly it is not possible to extrapolate linearly from corporate behaviour to 
households in adjustment to over-indebtedness.  But it would not be unreasonable to 
expect that this crisis could well produce the much-awaited retrenchment in private 
consumption, a sustained upward shift in the household savings rate and a durable 
adjustment in the United States external deficits beyond what may be expected from a 
slowing economy.   This adjustment could be a protracted process, resulting in erratic 
and slow growth, as in Japan during the 1990s.  The corollary is that the rest of the 
world would need to rely less on the United States’ market for growth.  Thus, the 
crisis is likely to bring a fundamental adjustment to global imbalances, but the key 
question is how orderly and rapid that would be. 
 
 
  144.  CAPITAL FLOWS AND VULNERABILITY IN ASIA  
 
a.  Lessons from the 1997 crisis 
 
There can be little doubt that vulnerability of Asian developing countries to 
the current financial turmoil depends crucially on their prevailing macroeconomic and 
financial conditions.  Experience from recurrent crises in emerging markets shows 
that these conditions are strongly influenced by international capital flows. 
Accordingly, the likelihood of contagion is closely related to how well the recent 
surge in capital inflows has been managed in the region.  In this respect it is possible 
to draw on the lessons from the 1997 Asian crisis, focussing on four main areas of 
vulnerability associated with surges in capital inflows:
20   
 
•  Currency and maturity mismatches in private balance sheets and exposure to 
exchange rate risks. 
 
•  Rapid credit expansion, asset bubbles and excessive investment in property 
and other sectors.   
 
•  Unsustainable currency appreciations and external deficits.   
 
•  Lack of self-insurance against a sudden stop and reversal of capital flows, and 




These lessons should generally be incontrovertible, at least among the policy 
makers in the region, but opinions may differ considerably about the ways and means 
of putting them into practice.  In what follows, an assessment will be made as to 
whether the Asian developing countries have appropriately drawn on these in 
managing the recent surge in capital flows.  The conclusion reached is that while most 
Asian countries have successfully avoided unsustainable currency appreciations and 
payments positions, and accumulated more than adequate international reserves to 
counter any potential current and capital account shocks without recourse to 
multilateral financial institutions, they have not always been able to prevent capital 
                                                 
20  Not all Asian countries hit by the crisis manifested vulnerability in all these areas − see UNCTAD 
TDR (1998) and Akyüz (2000).  
  15inflows from generating asset, credit and investment bubbles or maturity and currency 
mismatches in private balance sheets.  This is in large part because they have been 
unwilling to impose sufficiently tight controls over capital inflows, even when they 
posed dilemmas in macroeconomic policy and generated fragility.  These now expose 
them to certain risks, but not of the kind that devastated the region in the 1990s.   
 
b. Capital  flows 
 
The search for yield triggered by ample liquidity and low interest rates has 
also played a central role in the recovery of capital flows to emerging markets, 
creating pressures on exchange rates and generating credit and asset bubbles.  After 
falling to some $100 billion at the beginning of the millennium, private flows picked 
up rapidly, reaching an estimated level of $620 billion in 2007 (Table 2).
21  This has 
been accompanied by a rapid narrowing of spreads on emerging-market debt.  The 
average spread, which had reached 1400 basis points after the Russian crisis and 
fluctuated between 600 and 1000 basis points during the early years of the 
millennium, fell constantly from mid-2002 onwards, reaching 200 basis points in the 
first half of 2007 before starting to edge up with the deepening of the subprime crisis 
(World Bank 2007; IMF 2007a).  That improvements in underlying economic 
fundamentals in the recipient countries are not always the main reason for this 
unprecedented decline in spreads is also recognized by the IMF: 
 
“Very recent empirical work, including some undertaken by IMF staff for this report, 
appears to reinforce the widespread market view that liquidity and an increase in risk 
appetite have become relatively more significant influences on spreads than 
fundamentals in the emerging market debt rally that began in late 2002.  Models 
based purely on fundamentals have found that recent emerging market bond spreads 
are generally tighter than can be justified by the models” (IMF 2004: 66). 
 
                                                 
21  The underlying figures in Table 2 are on net-net basis for equity flows and gross basis for debt 
flows; that is, net outflows of FDI and portfolio equity by residents are deducted from net inflows by 
non-residents.  Thus, the current account balance plus private capital flows minus net lending by 
residents (and errors and omissions) would give changes in reserves − see IIF (October 2007:  Box 3).  
The countries included are China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand in 
Asia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin 
America; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Turkey 
and Ukraine in Europe; and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia in Africa/Middle East. 
  16Because of strong and favourable global push factors concerning liquidity and 
risk, recovery in capital flows has been broad-based, widely shared by all regions.  
But country-specific conditions (the pull factors) explain why inflows have been 
stronger in certain parts of the developing world than in others.
22  The pull factors 
have not always been linked to economic fundamentals such as growth and price 
stability, and external payments, debt or reserve positions.  In fact international 
financial markets have made little differentiation among countries with respect to 
many of these factors, focussing, instead, on opportunities for short-term capital gains 
and arbitrage profits. 
 
There have been considerable amounts of footloose capital motivated by 
speculative gains in all parts of the developing world, although the exact form it has 
taken has varied among countries depending on their individual circumstances.  Such 
flows fall basically into three categories.  First, capital attracted by carry trade profits 
due to large interest rate differentials with industrial countries, notably Japan, of 
which highly leveraged hedge funds have been among the main beneficiaries.
23  
Second, capital inflows seeking gains from prospective currency appreciations in 
countries with undervalued exchange rates and large current account surpluses, 
notably China.  Third, investment in asset markets, which have been a common 
feature of capital flows to emerging markets in different regions. 
       
It is notable that during 2004-07 emerging markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe received as much foreign private capital as those in Asia even though their 
total income is one-fifth of the total income of Asia, and their average growth has 
been much lower.  The combination of high interest rates with independent floating 
has resulted in growing current account deficits which reached, on average, 7 per cent 
of GDP in 2007.
24  High interest rates in some larger economies in Europe and Latin 
                                                 
22 That the push factor is generally more important in boom-bust cycles in international capital flows is 
also noted by the World Bank (2003: 26): the “dynamics of net capital inflows and the changes of 
official reserves over the cycle do indeed indicate that the push factor is more important for middle-
income countries, while the pull factor dominates in high-income countries.”     
23 On different forms of carry trade and interest differentials, see BIS (2007a: 83-88); UNCTAD TDR 
(2007: Chap. I) and IIF (October 2007). 
24 For current account and growth figures in Central and Eastern Europe (excluding the Russian 
Federation), see IMF (2007c: Tables A4 and A12). 
  17America (e.g. Turkey and Brazil) attracted large amounts of capital linked to carry 
trade.  There have also been considerable intra-regional carry trade activities in these 
regions where funds borrowed in low-interest currencies have been invested in the 
same region in higher-interest currencies, thereby providing some protection against 
intra-regional contagion.  High local interest rates have also attracted international 
investors to domestically-issued local-currency debt, as these investors have become 
more willing to assume the exchange rate risk in return for much higher yields.
25  
  
In gross terms capital inflows to Asia, as a proportion of GDP, have been close 
to historical highs, but in net terms they have been around the long-term average 
because of increased resident outflows (IMF 2007b; IIF October 2007).  Since 2003, 
about 60 per cent of private capital inflows to the Asian countries in Table 2 have 
been in equity investment, compared to less than 40 per cent in other emerging 
markets.  Of these, two-thirds have been in direct equity and one-third in portfolio 
equity.
26  Equity flows have been particularly strong in China and, more recently, 
India.  But in the latter country much of these are in portfolio equity rather than FDI.   
Hedge funds from the United States and the United Kingdom have been very active in 
equity markets, with assets managed by them being estimated to have grown 
sevenfold between 2001 and 2007.   
 
Following the cutback in bank lending after the 1997 crisis, international bank 
inflows to Asia started to exceed repayments in the early years of the decade.  The 
share of net international bank lending has been slightly over one-quarter of the total 
private inflows to Asia, and the remainder is other types of debt flows including bonds 
and carry-trade-related inflows, including those involving arbitrage among regional 
currencies.  Sovereign bond issues have been relatively small in Asia because of 
                                                 
25 The proportion of domestic-currency sovereign debt held by non-residents in emerging markets is 
estimated to have reached 12 per cent − Mehl and Reynaud (2005) and De Alessi Gracio, Hoggarth and 
Yang (2005).  The expansion appears to be particularly rapid in Latin America due to high levels of 
sovereign debt.   Available data shows that foreign investment in local-currency government securities 
went from less than $15 billion at the beginning of 2003 to $200 billion by the end of 2006 − see Tovar 
and Quispe-Agnoli (2008).  Moreover, some Latin American countries have been able to issue local-
currency-denominated global bonds at rates below those in domestic markets because of lower 
jurisdiction spreads (Tovar 2005; IMF 2005).   
26 For further discussion of components of capital flows to Asian emerging markets, see BIS (2007a), 
IMF (2007d and 2007e) and McCauley (2008). 
  18strong fiscal and public debt positions.  However, there has been a visible growth in 
syndicated loans privately placed by corporations in several countries.  In many cases 
bank inflows have been encouraged by prospects of gains from currency 
appreciations.  However, private financial and non-financial corporations have also 
engaged in “carry-trade-style” short-term external borrowing in India, Korea and the 
Philippines, particularly through low-interest yen-linked loans.  Highly leveraged 
hedge funds are also known to be very active in carry trades in Asia.  A relatively 
high volume of carry trade appears to be a reason why the category “other 
investment” accounts for a high share of total capital inflows to the region.  While 
restrictions on foreign participation in domestic bond markets have generally been 
maintained, in Malaysia and Indonesia there have been marked increases in foreign 
holding of local-currency debt instruments.  In the region as a whole local claims of 
foreign banks, including local bond holdings, as a percentage of all foreign banks’ 
claims, more than doubled since the beginning of the decade, suggesting a growing 
preference for international banks to lend in local currencies at higher rates.      
 
c.  Credit, asset and investment bubbles 
 
       The composition of capital inflows to Asian emerging markets is generally 
considered to be more favourable than other emerging markets because of a high 
share of equity flows.  Foreign investment in equity and local-currency debt is not 
considered as a serious potential threat to stability because the exchange rate risk is 
assumed by investors.  Vulnerability to a sudden stop and reversal of capital flows is 
often assessed on the basis of short-term external liabilities in relation to reserves.  
Indeed, according to the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti rule formulated after the Asian 
crisis, in order to avoid a liquidity crisis international reserves in emerging markets 
should meet short-term external liabilities, defined as debt with a remaining maturity 
of up to one year.
27
 
However, what matters for vulnerability to instability in capital flows is not 
simply currency denomination and maturity but also liquidity of liabilities.  A run by 
                                                 
27  For a discussion of adequate level of reserves, see UNCTAD TDR (1999: Chap. V).  For an attempt 
to empirically determine the optimum level of reserves based on welfare criteria, see Jeanne and 
Rancière (2006). 
  19non-residents away from domestic equity and bond markets could create significant 
turbulence in currency and asset markets with broader macroeconomic consequences, 
even though declines in asset prices could mitigate the pressure on the exchange rate, 
and losses from asset price declines and currency collapses fall on foreign investors.  
This potential source of instability naturally depends on the relative importance of 
foreign participation in local financial markets.  Extensive foreign participation not 
only increases market volatility, but also raises exposure to adverse spillovers and 
contagion from financial instability abroad.  That such exposure has been on the rise 
is suggested by increased correlation between global and emerging-market equity 
returns since 2004.
28    
 
Recent capital inflows have resulted in a rapid increase in foreign presence in 
Asian equity markets.  Figures for net equity inflows understate this because, as 
noted, there has also been a rapid increase in resident outflows.  Available evidence 
shows that non-resident holding of Korean equities reached almost one half of market 
capitalization (McCauley 2008).  According to a recent study on foreign net purchases 
and net sales of equities in Asian markets, the share of foreigner transactions in 2005 
in average daily turnover was around 20 per cent in Korea, 30 per cent in Thailand 
and 75 per cent in Taiwan (China) while in total holdings by foreigners accounted for 
between 20 and 30 per cent in India, Korea and Thailand and as high as 70 per cent in 
Taiwan (China).  There is also strong evidence that the entry and exit of foreigners to 
Asian equity markets are subject to a bandwagon effect − that is, foreign investors 
tend to move in and out of several Asian markets simultaneously − suggesting strong 
contagious influences across the region.  Although equity inflows into this group of 
countries appear to have been driven not so much by gains from anticipated currency 




                                                 
28  See BIS (2007a: 51) which points out that this correlation has been higher during the most recent 
periods of global market volatility. 
29 For the evidence cited in this section, see Chai-Anant and Ho (2008).  The evidence is from six 
emerging Asian markets − India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. 
  20A relatively large proportion of financial inflows to China appears to have 
been motivated by expectations of appreciation of the yuan (Setser 2008; Yu 2008).  
These have gone partly in equity and property markets, benefiting also from local 
price booms.  Part of these is reported to have entered the country as investment or 
through trade, including over-invoicing of exports.  According to some market 
participants, the so-called “hot money” amounted to $5 to $10 billion a month during 
2007.  The Chinese foreign exchange regulators felt obliged to take action against ten 
international banks for breaching capital account regulations by “assisting speculative 
foreign capital to enter the country disguised as trade and investment” (Anderlini 
2007).    
 
Large capital inflows to equity markets − together with the consequent 
expansion of liquidity − have both been the cause and effect of sharp increases in 
stock prices in several Asian markets.  There is in fact a strong correlation between 
changes in net portfolio equity flows and stock prices in Asia − much stronger than 
that observed in Latin America.
30  For the region as a whole the equity market index 
tripled between 2002 and mid-2007, with increases exceeding 400 per cent in China 
and India.  The price/earnings ratios have also risen rapidly, resulting in a sharp drop 
in equity costs.
31  That such increases more likely reflect asset-price bubbles than 
improvements in underlying fundamentals was actually cautioned a couple of years 
ago by the Institute of International Finance (IIF March 2005: 4): “there is a risk that 
the pickup in flows into some emerging market assets has pushed valuations to levels 
that are not commensurate with underlying fundamentals.”  It is notable that since 
then until mid-2007 the Asian markets rose by another 50 per cent.  China increased 
the stamp duty on stock market transactions in order to restrain the bubble, only to 
reverse it after the recent decline due to the fallout from the subprime crisis. 
 
The two largest countries, China and India, which have seen the strongest 
surge in capital inflows and largest increases in stock markets, and, to a lesser extent, 
                                                 
30  See IIF (October 2007: Chart 13).  IMF (2007e), however, finds that institutional investors appear to 
have little impact on equity prices in emerging markets, but introduce considerable volatility because of 
herd behaviour.  
31 Data on equity prices and price/earnings ratios are from IMF (2007e).  
  21Korea, have also experienced a boom in property markets.  During 2002-06 in real 
terms residential property prices rose by over 8 per cent per annum in China and 10 
per cent in India.
32  In these countries the price-to-rent ratio rose by more than 20 per 
cent during the same period while Korea saw an increase of more than 15 per cent.  
The last couple of years have also seen acceleration of property price increases in 
Singapore and Vietnam.  While these have not been as dramatic as increases in the 
United States − where the price-to-rent ratio rose by 30 per cent over the same period 
− there are large pockets in China, India, Korea and the Philippines where increases 
have been comparable and even greater.
33  Concerned by the growing speculative 
spree, China has adopted a number of measures to stem increases in property prices, 
including higher interest rates and larger downpayments on both residential and 
commercial property loans (ESCAP 2007: 10). 
 
In some cases house prices have also outstripped strong growth in incomes.  
Housing loans have expanded faster than other types of lending and have been a 
major factor in sharp increases in household indebtedness.  In Korea, for instance, 
bank lending to households has been growing rapidly since 2005, and household debt 
has reached 140 per cent of disposable income − above the level of household 
indebtedness in the United States (ADB 2007a).  While detailed data are limited, there 
are indications that speculative purchases motivated by strong prices as well as 
foreign demand for commercial space have made an important contribution to the 
boom in property markets in India and China. 
 
Recent booms in housing and equity markets in Asia are a source of concern 
because of their potential adverse macroeconomic consequences.  There is evidence, 
not only from industrial countries, but also from a number of Asian emerging markets, 
including Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, that such booms (defined as periods in which asset prices 
exceed their trend by more than 10 per cent) significantly raise the probability of 
                                                 
32 For an analysis of developments in Asian housing markets, see IMF (2007b) which somewhat 
underplays the extent of the bubble and the risks involved, but nevertheless points out that speculative 
dynamics cannot be ruled out, notably in China, India and Korea.      
33 Korean and the United States data from OECD (2007: annex table 60).  For the others, see BIS 
(2007a: 50), and IMF (2007b). 
  22output being eventually pushed below its potential level and the price level above its 
trend (Gochoco-Bautista 2008).  This implies that monetary and capital account 
policies should not neglect developments in asset markets since their longer-term 
consequences may undermine price stability and growth. 
     
Rapid domestic credit expansion and low interest rates have played an 
important role in bubbles in equity and property markets in Asia.  As in some mature 
economies, monetary policy has been highly expansionary and real interest rates have 
been considerably lower than those in other regions.  However, the surge in capital 
flows is part of the reason for rapid expansion of liquidity since interventions in 
foreign exchange markets (discussed below) could not be fully sterilized.  After 2003 
private credit growth in real terms reached nearly 9 per cent per annum in China and 5 
per cent in other countries.
34  Ample liquidity, low equity costs and loan rates together 
have made a strong impact on investment spending, occasionally pushing it to levels 
that may not be sustained over the longer term.  
   
This is particularly the case in China and, to a lesser extent, India −  
investment rates in most other Asian countries did not fully regain their pre-crisis 
levels.
35  In China gross fixed capital formation has been growing 4-5 percentage 
points faster than real income, with the share of investment in GDP now reaching 46 
per cent.  This increase appears to have been associated with considerable excess 
capacity and wastage of capital.  Although 40 per cent of China’s state-owned 
industrial enterprises are reported to have been running losses and facing declining 
rates of return on capital, easy access to credit has been encouraging overinvestment 
(BIS 2007a: 56).  In the event of a sharp upward adjustment in the exchange rate and 
a slowdown in exports, the capacity built in some industries may become unviable.
36  
Similarly in India growth in investment has been faster than GDP by more than 5 
percentage points per annum, with the investment ratio rising to over 30 per cent of 
GDP from less than 24 per cent in the early years of the decade.  This has been greatly 
                                                 
34  For credit conditions and interest rates in Asia, see BIS (2007a: 39-41), Mohanty and Turner (2006: 
43), and IMF (2007c: 5).  
35  For a discussion of why boom-bust-recovery cycles harm investment, see Akyüz (2008). 
36 See Goldstein and Lardy (2004), Nagaraj (2005) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006) on excess 
capacity, waste and sustainability of the investment boom in China.      
  23facilitated by capital inflows, credit and asset bubbles, and may not be sustained with 
the return of normal financial conditions. 
  
d.  Current account balances, exchange rates and reserves 
 
While major Asian emerging markets have not been able to prevent capital 
inflows from leading to asset and investment bubbles, they have been more successful 
in managing their impact on exchange rates and the current account.  Developing 
countries of the region taken together had a current account surplus of more than 7 per 
cent of GDP in 2007, up from 1.5 per cent in 2001.  This is largely due to China’s 
strong export performance, but a number of other countries have also been enjoying 
surpluses, including Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines.  Among the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) Singapore continues 
to run a massive current account surplus while in Korea the current account has been 
broadly in balance.  Current account deficits have been increasing in India, Pakistan 
and Vietnam in the past few years, but only in Pakistan has it been approaching the 
danger zone, expected to reach some 5 per cent of GDP at the end of 2007.  However, 
these trends reflect not so much the effects of currency appreciations as acceleration 
of growth from the first half of the decade. 
 
Since the Asian crisis, several countries in the region have moved towards 
more flexible exchange rate arrangements.  But they have followed various shades of 
managed floating rather than leaving their currencies entirely to the whims of 
international capital flows.  Most countries have strived to absorb excess supply of 
foreign exchange generated by strong capital inflows and/or current account surpluses 
in reserves through interventions in foreign exchange markets, rather than allowing 
them to push up currencies to unsustainable levels and undermine their trade 
performance.  To keep liquidity expansion and inflation under control, attempts have 
been made to sterilize such interventions, mainly by issuing government and/or 
central bank debt and by raising reserve requirements in the banking system. 
 
Currency market interventions are generally believed to be ineffective in 
mature economies.  The IMF has also drawn a similar conclusion from its research on 
developing countries; that is, sterilized intervention in emerging markets is likely to 
  24be ineffective when the influx of capital is persistent, and tends to be associated with 
higher inflation (IMF 2007c: 122-24).  By contrast, recent work in the BIS (2005) 
shows that sterilized interventions in Asia have been reasonably effective in 
influencing the exchange rate without leading to loss of control over inflation.
37  
There have been relatively sizeable appreciations in some countries, but these are 
moderate in comparison with those in other emerging markets where independent 
floating is practised.  Moreover, appreciations in Asia have occurred under much 
more favourable current account positions and faster economic growth.
38
 
The monetary impact of interventions has not been fully offset particularly in 
China where large trade surpluses added to the glut of foreign exchange generated by 
the surge in capital flows.  However, despite rapid expansion of liquidity generated by 
interventions and loose monetary conditions, inflation has been kept under control, 
though only in product markets, not in asset markets.   
 
In China, government control over the financial system has allowed it to keep 
the fiscal cost of intervention down.
39  Reserve requirements of banks were constantly 
raised from 7 per cent in 2003 to 15 per cent in 2008, and banks have come to hold 
over 80 per cent of central bank securities issued for that purpose, with their share in 
total bank assets exceeding 20 per cent (Yu 2008).  In India the cash reserve ratio was 
also increased in several steps, from 4.75 per cent in 2003 to 7.5 per cent in 2008, but 
                                                 
37  See, notably, Disyatat and Galati (2005), Mihaljek (2005) and Mohanty and Turner (2006); and for a 
general survey of the issues involved, see Sarno and Taylor (2001).      
38 Most Latin American and European emerging markets have experienced sizeable appreciations in 
real effective exchange rates − see UNCTAD TDR (2007) and IIF (October 2007).  According to 
UNCTAD figures, real effective exchange rates were relatively stable in India and China during 2002-
06 while Indonesia saw an appreciation of over 20 per cent and Malaysia close to 10 per cent.   
Appreciations in Korea and Thailand were in the order of 10 per cent − see also BIS (2007a: 41, 81).   
India, the Philippines and Thailand saw relatively strong appreciations in 2007. 
39 The fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) cost of each dollar of reserves acquired through intervention can be 
written as:  ig – ir = (ig – ix) + (ix – ir) where ig, ir and i x are the rates, in common currency, on 
government domestic debt, reserve holdings and external borrowing, and typically ig > ix > ir.   The 
margin between ix and ir is determined mainly by the credit risk and between ig and ix by the exchange 
rate risk.  When non-resident claims are only in foreign currencies, the first term on the right-hand side 
of the equation is captured by the holders of public debt at home and the second term is the net transfer 
abroad − what Rodrik (2006) calls the social cost of foreign exchange reserves.  For the distinction 
between the two types of transfers and costs, see UNCTAD TDR (1999: Chap. V).  Mohanty and 
Turner (2006) provide some estimates of fiscal cost of intervention in emerging markets. 
  25because of higher interest rates, the cost of intervention reached 2 per cent of GDP in 
2007 − more than half of the central government deficits.
40
 
As of end-2007, total reserves in developing Asia (excluding NIEs) exceeded 
$2 trillion and over 80 per cent of these were generated after 2001 (Table 3).  Asian 
reserves now account for more than half of total reserves of the developing world.  
The twin surpluses that the region as a whole has been running on its balance of 
payments (that is, on both current and capital accounts) have been fully converted into 
reserves.
41  Of the $1.7 trillion reserves accumulated after 2001, almost two-thirds are 
earned and one-third “borrowed”.
42  Unlike other regions, therefore, reserve increases 
in Asia have come mainly from current account surpluses rather than capital inflows 
(Table 2).
43  Moreover, these reserves are earned in the context of rapid growth, rather 
than by sacrificing growth.
44  However, excluding China, two-thirds of Asian reserves 
in recent years are also from capital inflows.  In India and other Asian countries with 
current account deficits, reserves are one hundred per cent “borrowed”.    
 
On the Greenspan-Guidotti rule noted above, Asian reserves are excessive.  
They are several times the total short-term external debt of the region, which stood at 
less than $300 billion at the end of 2007, and more than twice the total external debt 
of some $950 billion.
45  They now cover close to nine months of imports, much 
                                                 
40  Fiscal cost from ESCAP (2007: 21) and central government deficits from IMF (2007d: 20).   
41 Here capital account surplus is used in the conventional sense; that is, surplus on non-reserve 
financial account.   
42 “Borrowed” in the sense that they accompany increased claims by non-residents in one form or 
another, including direct and portfolio equity investment, which entail outward income transfers.   
43  In most emerging markets in Table 2 reserves are fully borrowed since the current account is 
broadly balanced.  In some, notably in Europe, however, net capital inflows are used partly to finance 
current account deficits and partly to add to reserves.  
44 For instance Brazil also earns reserves by running a current account surplus, but this is accompanied 
by sluggish growth.  Because of a high degree of vulnerability to deterioration in the market sentiment, 
monetary and fiscal policies have been kept tight, restraining growth and imports.  With the recent 
acceleration of growth towards 6 per cent, the Brazilian current account has indeed started to run 
deficits.  
45  On external debt, see IMF (2007c).  According to BIS (2007a: 94), at the end of 2006 reserves in 
China were 13 times the short-term debt, defined as bank debt with a maturity up to and including one 
year plus international debt securities with a maturity of up to one year.  
  26higher than the three months of imports traditionally considered as adequate for 
addressing the liquidity problems arising from time lags between payments for 
imports and receipts from exports.  
 
A policy of accumulating reserves at times of strong capital inflows and using 
them during sudden stops and reversals appears to be a sensible counter-cyclical 
response to instability in international capital flows.  By intervening in the foreign 
exchange market and accumulating reserves, a country facing a surge in capital flows 
can both reduce its external vulnerability by preventing appreciations and trade 
deficits, and secure self-insurance against possible speculative attacks.  In other 
words, if inflows are believed to be temporary, it would be rational to resist an inward 
transfer by allowing the domestic consumption and/or investment to increase and the 
current account to run into deficits through faster growth and appreciations.
46
 
However, such a strategy lacks a strong rationale because it implies that a 
country would borrow even if the funds thus acquired are not used to finance 
investment and imports, but held in short-term foreign assets.  This is all the more so 
because reserves accumulated out of capital inflows are highly costly − that is, the 
return earned on reserves is less than the cost of foreign capital, including the cost of 
foreign borrowing and the foregone return on assets sold.  In fact it is more so for 
portfolio equity and particularly FDI flows for acquisition of ownership rights of 
existing assets where rates earned by transnational companies exceed the cost of 
international borrowing by a very large margin (UNCTAD TDR 1999: Chap. V).  
  
In previous decades the current account in Asia was generally in deficit so that 
a very large proportion of reserves held at the beginning of this decade was 
“borrowed” rather than earned reserves.  If this is added to reserves accumulated from 
capital inflows since 2001, about half of the total stock of reserves in Asia now would 
be “borrowed” reserves.  This is approximately equal to the existing stock of external 
debt of the region.  Assuming a moderate 500-basis-point margin between the interest 
cost on debt and the return on reserves, this would give an annual carry cost of $50 
                                                 
46 See Williamson (1995) on the rationality of reserve accumulation under such conditions.  Polak and 
Clark (2006: 555) refer to fear of floating in explaining reserve holding in China, Korea and Singapore. 
  27billion for the region as a whole.
47  This is how much the region as a whole could 
save per year by paying up its external debt by drawing on reserves.
48  The carry cost 
of reserves accumulated from debt-creating and portfolio equity inflows since the 
beginning of the decade alone can be estimated to be as much as half of this amount.  
It would be much higher if FDI inflows for acquisitions are included.  Furthermore, in 
view of the ongoing downward pressure on the dollar, countries with a large stock of 
dollar reserves stand to incur considerable losses.       
 
The high carry cost of reserves in excess of possible liquidity needs, together 
with the risk of exchange-rate-related losses, raise the question of alternative 
investments in higher-yielding foreign securities, primarily through SWFs, as done by 
several fuel exporters.  Like China, fuel exporters as a group also generate large 
current account surpluses, but unlike China, they run deficits in their capital accounts.  
About one-third of oil surpluses generated since 2002 have been used for investment 
abroad and two-thirds for reserve accumulation.  In several of them investment is 
undertaken mainly by SWFs.  According to some estimates, total assets of SWFs in 
fuel exporters exceed $1.5 trillion (IMF 2007e: Annex 1.2; Truman 2007b).  These 
funds come out of government earnings from oil exports rather than from reserves 
purchased from the private sector.  In Asia, with the notable exception of Singapore, 
SWFs are relatively small.  At some $200 billion, the assets of the recently established 
China Investment Cooperation (CIC) are only a fraction of the total reserves of the 
country, and only a small part of these appear to have been used for investment 
abroad.   
 
As noted above, SWFs have recently been acquiring high-risk equity in 
western banks hit by the subprime crisis, thereby acting as a global force for stability 
while suffering losses.  However, given the deep suspicion and misgivings about 
SWFs in some advanced countries, massive amounts of Asian reserves cannot be 
                                                 
47 This figure appears quite modest if one takes the average spread over the full boom-bust cycles in 
capital flows to emerging markets.  For instance the average spread of emerging-market bonds 
exceeded 700 basis points during the 1990s and never fell below 400 basis points. 
48  Since “borrowed” reserves of some countries fall short of their total external debt, realization of this 
aggregate benefit would require lending by countries with excess reserves to those with deficits at rates 
earned on reserves.  
  28expected to be quickly translated into investment in more lucrative, less risky assets in 
these countries.  An alternative would be to recycle them in the region for, inter alia, 
infrastructure projects in low-income countries in need of development finance.   This 
may best be achieved through a genuinely regional development bank, established 
among the developing countries of the region along the lines of the recent Banco del 
Sur in Latin America.  
 
e.  Capital account measures 
 
Many Asian emerging markets are incurring high reserve costs and facing 
macroeconomic policy dilemmas mainly because they have chosen to keep their 
economies open to the surge in capital inflows, rather than imposing tighter counter-
cyclical measures of control.
49  Indeed, capital accounts in the region are more open 
today than they were during the Asian crisis.
50  In China, for instance, one of the 
countries with the tightest restrictions, calculations based on an IMF formula are said 
to show that 80 per cent of the capital account has been liberalized (Yu 2008).     
 
In several cases the opening to inflows has been selective, such as raising the 
limits on the QFII (qualified foreign institutional investors) in China.  Countries such 
as India have liberalized sectoral caps on FDI.  Foreign banks have generally been 
allowed greater freedom to operate, with many domestic borrowers receiving funding 
from such banks directly from abroad or through their local offices.  However, there 
have been some efforts to bring greater transparency to capital inflows.  For instance, 
in 2007 India adopted a proposal by the Securities and Exchange Board to restrict the 
foreign buying of shares through offshore derivatives despite an adverse initial 
reaction from the stock market − a move that was designed not so much to relieve the 
upward pressure on the rupee as to bring greater transparency by restricting the 
activities of hedge funds.  
   
                                                 
49 These include direct restrictions over foreign borrowing by residents and access of non-residents to 
domestic securities markets, supplemented by market-based or administrative restrictions over maturity 
and currency mismatches in banks’ balance sheets and restrictions designed to limit exchange-rate-
related credit risks − for a discussion, see Akyüz (2008). 
50 For recent measures in Asia, see BIS (2007a); IMF (2007b and 2007e); and McCauley (2008). 
  29Efforts have no doubt been made to curb excessive inflows in order to ease the 
upward pressure on their currencies.  In 2006 China extended to foreign banks the 
restriction over borrowing abroad to fund domestic dollar assets.  At the end of 2006 
Korea raised banks’ reserve requirements from 5 per cent to 7 per cent in order to 
support the dollar vis-à-vis the won.  Around the same time Thailand imposed a 30 
per cent reserve requirement on capital inflows held less than one year, including 
portfolio equity flows, in order to check continued appreciation of the currency.  This 
provoked a strong reaction from the stock market, forcing the government to exempt 
investment in stocks from reserve requirements.  The remaining restrictions were 
removed in March 2008.   With continued surge in capital inflows India reversed the 
liberalization of the limits on external commercial borrowing, tightening them in 
2007.  Similarly, Korea restricted external funding of domestic lending by foreign 
banks and reintroduced limits on lending in foreign currency to domestic firms.    
  
However, the main response to the surge in capital inflows has been to 
liberalize outward investment by residents.  This is partly motivated by a desire to 
allow national firms to expand abroad and become important players in world 
markets.   This has particularly been the case in China and India.  However, while in 
China assets acquired abroad are financed from trade surpluses, in India these are 
funded by capital inflows, in much the same way as Korean chaebols did in the run-up 
to the 1997 crisis.
51  As remarked by an observer, “the global flood of money (and 
attendant hubris) has enabled Indian companies like Tata to buy themselves a place on 
the world stage rather than earning it through export success or technological 
advance” (Bowring 2008a).  
 
There has also been considerable liberalization of portfolio outflows.  For 
instance China took a decision to permit investment by its residents in approved 
overseas markets and raised the limits on corporate and individual purchases of 
foreign currency for mitigating the pressure for appreciation through the so-called 
QDII (qualified domestic institutional investor) scheme.  The share of portfolio 
investment in the total international assets of China in 2006 was three times that of 
FDI abroad; the former increased from under 10 per cent in 2004 to about 15 per cent 
                                                 
51 For a discussion of inward and outward FDI in India, see Chandrasekhar (2008). 
  30in 2006 while the share of FDI fell, to about 5 per cent in the latter year (Hang Seng 
Bank 2008).  
 
Korea has also liberalized rules limiting individual or institutional investment 
abroad, and even provided incentives for residents to invest in foreign securities and 
real estate assets.  Thailand raised the limits on and extended the duration of deposits 
that could be held abroad by resident corporations, removed restrictions over foreign 
currency accounts in local banks by residents, allowed investment by local funds 
abroad, and abolished the surrender requirement for Thai exporters.  The Philippines 
allowed residents to invest abroad without approval and raised the limits over such 
investment.  India liberalized resident outflows, giving greater freedom for portfolio 
investment abroad, and Malaysia increased the limit on foreign assets held by some 
institutional investors and investment trusts. 
 
Capital account opening for residents as a response to a surge in inflows is 
clearly an alternative to sterilized intervention and has the advantage of avoiding carry 
costs for reserves.  But, like interventions, it does effectively nothing to prevent 
currency and maturity mismatches in balance sheets, or instability and vulnerability to 
shocks associated with greater presence of foreigners in domestic asset markets.  Its 
rationale as a longer-term strategy for closer integration with global financial markets 
is highly contentious.  As a counter-cyclical measure, it can be even more problematic 
− once introduced for cyclical reasons, it may not be easily rolled back when 
conditions change.   Besides, in countries such as China where property rights are not 
clearly defined, liberalization of resident outflows could encourage asset stripping and 
money laundering (Yu 2008).    
 
 
5.  EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND POLICY OPTIONS IN ASIA 
 
a.  Growth prospects: projections and beyond 
 
Asia is now facing external shocks triggered by the subprime crisis, coming on 
top of stagflationary pressures exerted by the upward trend in oil prices.  However, 
there is a certain degree of compensation among the effects of these shocks.  Unlike in 
  31the 1970s when oil price hikes resulted from supply shocks, the recent trend has been 
driven by growing demand in the face of a slow and limited supply response, declines 
in production in maturing fields and bottlenecks in refinery capacity.
52  The weakness 
of the dollar has been a contributing factor since it means lower prices in currencies 
strengthening against the dollar and greater demand.  There is also a strong 
speculative element, resulting in sharp increases in relatively short periods of time, as 
declines in property and equity prices tend to divert excess liquidity to commodity 
markets.  However, to the extent that global growth slows down due to the subprime 
crisis, the demand pressure on oil prices could ease considerably even though a sharp 
reversal of the ongoing trend is quite unlikely.  Furthermore, an upward adjustment in 
Asian currencies would relieve inflationary effects of higher international prices of 
food and oil.        
 
Earlier projections for growth in 2008 in Asia and elsewhere of some of the 
more influential international and regional institutions made in the second half of 
2007 appeared to assume that the subprime crisis would only cause a hiccup in global 
economic activity, just as it was initially believed to be the case during the Asian 
crisis in 1997.  But even the most recent projections do not show a sharp deviation 
from the trend of rapid and broad-based growth that has been under way since the 
early years of the decade (Table 4).
53  For global growth, the drop projected in 2008 
from 2007 lies between 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points.  For the United States, the IMF 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) project a 0.7-percentage-point fall between 
2007 and 2008, but the Institute of International Finance (IIF) sees no change.  In 
these projections developing Asia is not expected to lose much momentum, with 
growth slowing down by no more than one percentage point.  
 
Perhaps more important are the revisions made to growth projections for 2008 
after the financial difficulties became more visible in the course of last autumn.   
Compared to projections made in July 2007, current projections for 2008 by the IMF 
                                                 
52 For comparison with the 1970s and the factors driving the recent hikes in oil prices, see UNCTAD 
TDR (2005), and for current market conditions and prospects, see IMF (2007c: Chap. 1).    
53  Large differences between growth rates for world output given by the IMF and other institutions in 
Table 4 are due to the use of purchasing power parity by the IMF. 
  32show a 1.1-percentage-point loss of growth for the world economy as a whole; 1.3 
points for the United States; and 0.5 points for Asian developing countries.
54  
Similarly, in March 2008 the ADB reduced its outlook for growth in the United States 
to 1.5 per cent and in Asia to 7.6 per cent from the earlier (September 2007) figures of 
2.6 per cent and 8.2 per cent, respectively (ADB 2007b).  
 
These projections are subject to usual caveats and generally accompanied by 
warnings that risks are downside.  Nevertheless, only the UN (2008) projections 
explore, under a “pessimistic scenario”, what might happen if such risks were to 
materialize.   The United States would go into a recession and growth in Asia and the 
world economy as a whole would both be more than halved.  This scenario assumes a 
sharp decline in house prices in the United States and a hard landing of the dollar, 
leading to increases in dollar interest rates.  Nevertheless, the United States recession 
would be quite mild compared to those in 1982 and 1991 when output contracted by 3 
per cent and 1 per cent respectively.  It is very much like the brief contraction in 2001, 
presumably reflecting counteracting influences from declines in house prices and 
sharp devaluation of the dollar on aggregate demand.  Recession and the decline of 
the dollar would result in sharp cuts in imports in the United States, affecting major 
exporters.  The dollar decline would also result in losses on dollar assets in countries 
with large holdings.  This appears to be the main financial impact: no explicit 
reference is made to possible consequences of the crisis for asset prices and 
investment in emerging markets, or the policy response.
55
 
b.  Financial contagion and shocks 
 
Asian economies do not appear to have large direct exposure to securitized 
assets linked to subprime lending, even though some losses have been reported in the 
                                                 
54 Just as this paper was being finalized the IMF cut its outlook for global growth for 2008 for the 
second time this year, to 3.7 per cent, and argued that a global recession – defined as a global growth 
rate below 3 per cent – was a possibility.  The projection for developing Asia is also cut from 8.6 per 
cent to 8.2 per cent, and the United States is expected to slip into a mild recession in 2008; see IMF 
World Economic Outlook, April 2008. 
55 The World Bank (2007: Table 1.3) simulates the impact of what it calls a prolonged recession in the 
United States on the world economy, triggered by a sharp fall in residential investment wherein growth 
in the United States would fall to 1 per cent.  This would cause a deceleration of growth in developing 
countries by no more than 0.6 percentage points. 
  33region.  The impact of the financial turmoil is likely to be transmitted through changes 
in the risk appetite and capital flows, in conditions of bubbles in domestic credit and 
asset markets in the larger economies of the region.  The question of sustainability of 
these bubbles had been raised before the subprime turmoil, and they have now 
become even more fragile.   
 
There is considerable uncertainty about the impact of the crisis on asset 
markets and capital flows in emerging markets as financial markets have shown signs 
of both decoupling and recoupling in recent months (BIS 2007b).  However, large 
drops in western equity markets caused by occasional bad news about financial losses 
have often been mirrored by similar changes in Asian markets.  Should such 
difficulties continue unabated, the likelihood of a sharp and durable correction in 
Asian markets is quite high.  By itself this may not lower growth by more than a 
couple of percentage points in China and India, and should not pose a serious problem 
since the recent pace of growth in these countries is generally viewed as 
unsustainable.
56  However, if combined with a sudden stop and reversal of capital 
flows and/or contraction of export markets, the impact on growth can be much more 
serious.    
 
It is generally expected that bank-related flows would decline in view of the 
losses many international banks are now incurring.  According to most recent 
projections by the IIF (2008), total private flows to emerging markets would be 
broadly the same in 2008 as in 2007; there would be a decline of some $25 billion in 
bank lending, compensated by increases in equity flows.  It is also argued that capital 
flows to emerging markets may even accelerate if Europe joins the United States in 
easy monetary policy.  That this possibility cannot be ruled out is suggested by the 
most recent estimates for private capital flows for 2007 which have now put them 
above the earlier estimates by some $60 billion because of a stronger growth of equity 
flows and limited impact of the financial turmoil on investment in fixed income funds 
and international bank lending (IIF 2008: 19).  The largest upward revision has been 
made for India, particularly for bank-related capital flows.  If continued, this could 
                                                 
56 On some accounts it might reduce the Chinese growth to 8 per cent − see Chancellor (2008).   
  34also imply decoupling of Asian equity markets from the United States and Europe and 
the persistence of credit and asset bubbles in China and India. 
 
It is quite likely that investors will now start differentiating among countries to 
a much greater extent than has been the case in recent years.  Countries with large 
current account deficits, high stocks of external debt, inadequate reserves and 
appreciated currencies in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere may face a 
sudden stop and even reversal of capital flows and sharp increases in spreads, 
resulting in exchange rate and balance-of-payments crises.
57  Given large stocks of 
reserves, even a generalized exit from emerging markets would not create serious 
payments difficulties for most Asian countries, and the impact would be felt primarily 
in domestic credit and asset markets.  Such an exit could be triggered by a widespread 
flight toward quality, with investors taking refuge in the safety of government bonds 
in advanced countries, or a need to liquidate their holdings in emerging markets in 
order to cover mounting losses and margin calls.
58   
 
The likelihood of a rapid exit of capital is difficult to assess, but it cannot be 
excluded.  A number of countries in Asia experienced a withdrawal of foreigners from 
stock markets during the May-June 2006 global selloff.  The amount of money taken 
out was small, in the order of some $15 billion, but it was the first reversal of capital 
flows after the Asian crisis and synchronized across all the countries studied.
59  Again 
there was a rapid liquidation by investors from advanced countries in several markets 
in Asia in summer 2007 as subprime losses started to surface.  Thus the region may be 
susceptible to common adverse external financial shocks, quite independent of 
specific circumstances prevailing in individual countries. 
 
                                                 
57  According to a World Bank (2007: Table 1.2) simulation, a once-and-for-all increase of 200 basis 
points in emerging-market spreads could bring down growth in developing (low- and middle-income) 
countries by 1.7 percentage points in 2008 and 0.9 per cent in 2009.  
58 McCauley (2008: 1) argues that a systematic withdrawal of funds from Asia in the latter sense 
requires a new image whereby “Asian markets provide liquidity under stressed conditions to portfolios 
managed in the major markets.” 
59 See Chai-Anant and Ho (2008).  The countries concerned are India, Indonesia, Korea, the 
Philippines, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. 
  35c.  Trade linkages and growth in Asia 
 
The decoupling debate is often carried out in terms of linkages between trade 
and growth; that is, how the trade between Asia and the United States would be 
affected and what impact this would have on growth in Asia.  These are contentious 
issues, but the weight of arguments leans towards the view that trade linkages would 
not result in a major adverse impact on growth in Asia, even allowing for a high 
degree of dependence on the United States market.  Exports to the United States 
amount to some 8 per cent of GDP in China and 6 per cent in other Asian countries.
60  
In value-added terms these ratios are lower, particularly in China and a few other 
assembly platforms such as Malaysia where exports still have high import contents 
even though domestic value-added contents have been rising in recent years as a result 
of upgrading.
61  Consequently, even if exports to the United States stop growing and 
even start declining in absolute terms as a result of a recession and weakening of the 
dollar, the Asian countries can still sustain rapid, albeit somewhat reduced, growth 
provided that other components of aggregate demand continue growing at their recent 
pace.    
 
This line of thinking clearly focuses on the impact of exports on aggregate 
demand, rather than on the foreign exchange constraint.  It is implicitly assumed that 
the countries affected can continue to maintain growth of imports despite reduced 
export earnings.  This would pose no major problem for those running large current 
account surpluses such as China, Malaysia and Singapore.  Others with deficits, such 
as India, however, would need to rely increasingly on capital inflows and/or draw on 
their reserves in order to finance the widening gap between imports and exports.       
 
This simple arithmetic is complicated by a number of factors.  First, the impact 
of a slowdown in the United States also depends on how Asian export markets 
                                                 
60  As of end-2006 China’s exports were just under 40 per cent of its GDP, with slightly over 20 per 
cent of total exports going to the United States.  For the remainder of the region the average export-
GDP ratio is somewhat higher, above 40 per cent, but the share of the United States in total exports is 
much lower.   
61  Increases in the domestic content of exports render China more vulnerable to external trade shocks.  
On upgrading and delinking of China’s exports from imports, see Cui and Syed (2007) and Cui (2007).     
  36elsewhere are affected.  The effect on growth in Europe can be significant because of 
its direct exposure to the subprime crisis.  Indeed, growth in the European Union is 
already falling below the levels of earlier projections.  Since exports to the European 
Union are about 7 per cent of GDP in China and even more in other Asian emerging 
markets, a sharp slowdown in Europe could have a relatively large impact.  The Asian 
trade balance with the European Union could deteriorate even further if currencies in 
the region start rising against the euro.   
 
Second, for some countries indirect exposure to a decline in growth of exports 
to the United States can be just as important because of relatively strong intra-
regional, intra-industry trade linkages.
62  More than two-thirds of Chinese imports 
consist of intermediate goods, and about a third of these are provided within the 
region, notably by Korea and Taiwan which individually account for around 10 per 
cent of total imports by China.  This means that a decline in Chinese exports to the 
United States would bring about a corresponding decline in imports of intermediate 
goods from the region.  Thus countries exporting these goods to China would be 
affected by cuts not only in their direct exports to the United States, but also in their 
indirect exports through China.  In these countries cuts in exports of intermediate 
goods to China would not entail an important offsetting decline in imports.   
Consequently, they could be affected even more than China by import cuts in the 
United States even when their direct exports to the United States are relatively small.  
For instance it has been estimated that a 10 per cent slowdown in United States 
imports would reduce China’s exports by 2.1 percent and Korea’s exports by 1.5 per 
cent.  The consequent drop in China’s imports from Korea would lower exports of 
that country by another 1.3 per cent (BIS 2007a).   Thus, Korea might be more 
vulnerable to a United States slowdown not only because its exports have higher value 
added, but also because it is indirectly exposed through exports to China.  This is 
likely to be true for Taiwan as well.      
 
Finally, domestic components of aggregate demand are not independent of 
exports.  This is particularly true for investment.  A deceleration in exports can lead to 
                                                 
62  That is, imports and exports within the same product categories − see UNCTAD TDR (2005), ADB 
(2007a) and IMF (2007d) for trade patterns and intra-regional trade in Asia. 
  37a sharp drop in investment designed to cater for foreign markets, which can, in turn, 
aggravate the impact of contraction in exports on aggregate demand.  This effect can 
be particularly strong in China where investment is a large component of aggregate 
demand and an important part of investment is linked to exports.  This includes 
greenfield FDI which has been channelled to export sectors through various 
restrictions and incentives, including tax rebates and foreign-exchange balancing 
requirements as part of an aggressive export strategy (Yu 2007).  The likelihood of a 
large drop in investment would be greater if contraction in export markets is 
accompanied by currency appreciations and asset price declines.  
 
d. Policy  challenges 
 
  A combination of severe external trade and financial shocks from the subprime 
crisis with domestic fragilities associated with credit, asset and investment bubbles 
could pose serious policy challenges in Asia, but above all in China and India.   
Whatever the nature and extent of contagion and shocks from the crisis, it is important 
to avoid destabilizing feedbacks between the real and financial sectors.  A sharp drop 
in exports together with a rapid correction in asset prices could bring down growth 
considerably, which can, in turn, threaten the solvency of the banking system given 
the high degree of leverage of some firms, particularly in China.
63  The appropriate 
policy response would be to expand domestic demand through fiscal stimulus, taking 
into account that a small dose of deceleration of growth towards more sustainable 
levels could be desirable.  If difficulties emerge in the financial sector, it would also 
be necessary to provide lender-of-last-resort financing.  Nevertheless, it is important 
that policy interventions aim not at preventing but smoothing correction in asset 
prices and facilitating restructuring in sectors which have been over-stretched thanks 
to easy financing conditions in recent years.  
 
However, China would need not just a counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
expansion, but a more durable shift in the composition of aggregate demand from 
exports towards domestic consumption because, as noted above, the crisis is likely to 
                                                 
63 BIS (2007a: 56) notes that in China the bulk of recorded profits are earned by relatively few 
enterprises while the rest has high leverage so that if growth slows significantly a substantial proportion 
of bank loans can become non-performing.  
  38bring a sizeable external adjustment in the United States.
64  Current economic 
conditions in China, including the twin balance-of-payments surpluses, growing 
reserves carried at high costs and risks, an undervalued currency, and an 
unprecedented growth in production capacity heavily dependent on external markets, 
cannot be defended on grounds of economic efficiency or expediency. This 
combination is sometimes linked to China’s development strategy.  On this view, a 
rapid reduction in unemployment through export-led growth calls for trade surpluses, 
undervalued exchange rates and capital controls.  It is also argued that the viability of 
this strategy also depends on China’s willingness to provide the external financing 
needed to the United States by translating its current and capital account surpluses 
into dollar reserves (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004; Aizenman 2007). 
 
However, as the experience of late industrializers, including first-tier NIEs and 
Japan, demonstrates, a development strategy emphasizing exports does not require 
generation of large and persistent current account surpluses through undervalued 
exchange rates.  An undervalued currency often leads to terms-of-trade losses, and 
this seems to be the case in China (Yu 2007).  It can also discourage technological 
upgrading and productivity growth.  For these reasons many of the early 
industrializers in East Asia, including Japan, rarely resorted to cheap money for 
industrial development − by contrast they occasionally tolerated moderate 
appreciations in order to provide incentives for productivity growth. 
  
A combination of current and capital account surpluses lacks a strong 
rationale.  If capital inflows continue at their recent pace or accelerate, a policy of 
controlled appreciation of the yuan combined with much tighter control over inflows 
and a long-term strategy of expansion of Chinese investment abroad, including in 
developing countries, would appear to be a desirable response on several grounds.  It 
would help achieve a soft landing by easing the upward pressures on asset prices, 
reducing the rate of liquidity expansion and enhancing monetary policy autonomy, 
                                                 
64  For a simulation of the trade impact of a sizeable adjustment in the United States deficits on 
countries in the Americas, see Weisbrot, Schmitt and Sandoval (2008).  In a high adjustment scenario 
where the United States’ trade deficit falls to 1.0 per cent of GDP by 2010, declines in exports of some 
of the countries heavily dependent on the United States such as Canada and Mexico are quite high, 
reaching 4 per cent of GDP.   However, these countries’ exports to the United States as a proportion of 
GDP are more than twice the level of China.  
  39and bringing down investment to sustainable levels.  It would also ease inflationary 
pressures in product markets, particularly those linked to oil and food imports, and 
reduce the pace of reserve hoarding and associated costs and risks.   
  
But perhaps a greater challenge would be to secure expansion of the internal 
market based on a much more rapid growth of consumption than has hitherto been the 
case.  Since the early years of the decade, growth in consumption in China has 
constantly lagged behind income and investment.  During 2002-07, the average 
growth rate of consumer spending was around 8 per cent per annum while gross fixed 
capital formation grew at a rate of 15 per cent and exports 25 per cent.  Consequently, 
the share of consumption fell below 40 per cent of GDP − almost half of the figure in 
the United States, and considerably less than the share of investment.
65 The imbalance 
between the two key components of domestic demand has meant increasing 
dependence of Chinese industry on foreign markets.  Indeed, China appears to be 
trading a lot more than would be expected on the basis of observed historical patterns 
linking trade to population size, income levels and resource endowments.   
 
The disparity between consumption and investment and the consequent 
dependence on foreign markets is largely a reflection of the imbalance between profits 
and wages.  It is true that success in industrialization crucially depends on the pace of 
capital accumulation, which, in turn, depends very much on the volume of profits and 
the extent to which they are used for investment rather than consumption.  High 
corporate retentions and a dynamic profit-investment nexus, rather than high 
household savings, were indeed the key distinguishing components of successful 
industrialization in East Asia (Akyüz and Gore 1996).  China is not an exception in 
this respect where corporate retentions exceed 20 per cent of GDP due to a high share 
of profits in value-added, the practice of non-payment of dividends to the government 
by state-owned enterprises, and tax incentives for retentions and investment.
66   
 
                                                 
65 Figures on growth in the components of aggregate demand are from World Bank Beijing Office 
(various issues).  See also Aziz and Dunaway (2007) on the evolution of the shares of private 
consumption and investment in GDP.  
66 See World Bank Beijing Office (August 2005), Kuijs (2005), Yu (2007) and Aziz and Dunaway 
(2007). 
  40In most late industrializers, particularly Japan and Korea, wages and 
household consumption grew in tandem with productivity and underpinned the 
expansion of productive capacity by providing a growing internal market.  In China, 
by contrast, despite registering impressive increases, wages have lagged behind 
productivity growth and their share in value-added has declined, and this is almost 
perfectly mirrored by the downward trend in the share of private consumption in 
GDP.
67  Since the early years of the decade labour productivity in manufacturing 
industry has grown by some 20 per cent per annum while nominal wage increases 
have been under 15 per cent and real wage increases even lower.  Profits rose faster 
than sales and the share of labour cost in total gross output in mining, manufacturing 
and utilities fell from 11.5 per cent in 2002 to 7.1 per cent in 2006; for the economy as 
a whole, the share of wages in GDP fell to about 40 per cent after fluctuating between 
50-55 per cent in the 1990s.  Furthermore, there are large precautionary savings out of 
wage incomes because of absence of adequate public health, education and social 
security services.  These savings are now increasingly held in stock trading accounts 
as the real return on bank deposits has been barely positive.  
 
All these imbalances are presumably among the problems that Premier Wen 
Jiabao was referring to when he pointed out at the National People’s Congress in 
March 2007 that “the biggest problem with China’s economy is that the growth is 
unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.”   They need to be addressed 
independent of the shocks from the subprime crisis if China is to avoid the kind of 
difficulties that Japan faced during much of the 1990s following the asset and credit 
bubbles and excessive investment in the late 1980s.
68  Expansion of public spending 
in areas such as health, education and social security, as well as transfers to poorer 
households financed, at least partly, by greater dividend payments by state-owned 
enterprises, can play an important role in lifting consumption spending.  If needed, 
this expenditure policy can also be combined with tighter credit policy in order to 
                                                 
67 On recent behaviour of labour productivity, profits and wages and consumption, see Kim and Kuijs 
(2007), and World Bank Beijing Office (August 2006; and February 2007).    
68  On parallels between China today and Japan in the late 1980s, see Summers (2007a) and BIS 
(2007a: 150), which argues that “given the recent rates of credit expansion, asset price increases and 
massive investment in heavy industry, the Chinese economy also seems to be demonstrating very 
similar, disquieting symptoms.”  On the role of sluggish wage growth in Japan, see UNCTAD TDR 
(2002 and 2003).   
  41check the rapid growth in investment.  Any incentive that higher interest rates may 
generate for arbitrage flows may be offset by tighter capital controls including 
implicit and explicit taxes and administrative restrictions.    
 
The shift towards a balance between domestic consumption and exports would 
necessitate a gradual restructuring of the industry so as to alter the product 
composition of supply to suit domestic tastes and preferences.  China’s export 
products are often designed for foreign markets and the existing capacity in some 
sectors cannot be fully utilized on the basis of expansion of domestic demand.  On the 
other hand, since skills and equipment are often industry-specific, they cannot be 
easily shifted between industries.  This means that adjustment in the production 
structure would be realized primarily by a reallocation of new investment and skills in 
favour of areas with domestic demand potentials.  However, this should not cause a 
major difficulty given the state guidance of investment. 
 
In East and South East Asian economies closely linked through production 
networks based on vertical integration, domestic stimulus would be needed to offset 
reduction in exports to advanced countries and China.  Given too many burdens 
already placed on monetary policy, including control over inflation and management 
of capital flows and exchange rates, the task falls again on fiscal policy.  Most 
countries in the region have considerable scope to respond by fiscal expansion, in 
very much the same way as they were able to do during the weakness of global 
demand after 2000 (Akyüz 2006).  The scope is somewhat limited in countries like 
India, Malaysia and Pakistan with relatively sizeable fiscal deficits.  For these 
countries it is particularly important to design fiscal stimuli in such ways that they do 
not add to structural deficits.   This is particularly important for India where budget 
deficits have been growing despite acceleration of growth, suggesting pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. 
   
On the external side, Asian developing countries appear to have sustainable 
current account positions as well as relatively large stocks of reserves to weather any 
potential worsening of their trade balances as a result of a slowdown in exports.   
Countries such as India, Pakistan and Vietnam which have recently been running 
current account deficits between 3 and 5 per cent of GDP could see their deficits rise 
  42further as exports slow down and growth of income and imports is sustained.  Given 
the relatively high levels of reserves, this should cause no serious problems.   
However, if slowdown in markets abroad is accompanied by a sudden stop or reversal 
of capital flows, the ability of these countries to give a positive response to external 
shocks could be greatly compromised.  In the case of India, the adverse impact on the 
economy could be aggravated by the bursting of the asset market bubble.  The twin 
structural deficits in fiscal and external accounts thus need greater attention for 
reducing vulnerability to shocks. 
 
  Low-income countries dependent on official financing are no doubt highly 
vulnerable to a sharp deterioration in global economic conditions, and many of them 
could see rapid increases in their current account deficits with a slowdown in trade in 
goods and services.  Indeed, in several of them, including small island economies, 
current account deficits as a proportion of GDP are already in double-digit figures.  
The external financing needs of these countries may well exceed the amounts 
available under normal access limits in the IMF, and they should be able to have 
access to additional financing through augmentation of resources made available 
under Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangements and the 
Exogenous Shocks Facility.   
 
Finally, a reasonable degree of consistency would need to be ensured in the 
region among policy responses of individual countries to external financial and trade 
shocks from the subprime crisis.  A coordinated macroeconomic expansion would 
certainly be desirable, but it would be even more important to secure cooperation and 
consistency in exchange rate policies.  Despite a clear division of labour and 
complementarity of trade based on vertical integration, trade patterns in East and 
South East Asian emerging markets are becoming increasingly competitive as 
followers in industrial development are rapidly closing the gap with the more 
advanced economies through upgrading and building production capacity to substitute 
imported components and parts with domestic production.  Under these conditions 
divergent movements in exchange rates can become highly disruptive and conflictual.  
Experience shows that such movements can become particularly intensive at times of 
severe external shocks and instability of trade and capital flows.  If shocks are severe, 
  43some countries may even be tempted to respond by beggar-my-neighbour exchange 
rate policies.   
 
It is, therefore, important to engage in regional consultations in exchange rate 
policies and explore durable currency arrangements.  The experience of the European 
Union in exchange rate cooperation starting with the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system and culminating in the European Monetary Union holds valuable lessons, even 
though it may not be fully replicated since the region is not yet ready to float 
collectively vis-à-vis the G3 currencies (viz., the dollar, euro and yen).  There are 
other, more flexible, options available, including common pegs or a system of 
managed floating vis-à-vis G3 currencies with intra-regional parity grids, which 
deserve attention.
69 Complementary arrangements should also be considered, 
including common sets of measures to curb excessive capital inflows, formal 
arrangements for macroeconomic policy coordination, surveillance of financial 
markets and capital flows and effective short-term intra-regional credit facilities based 





The world economy is going through difficult times.  With financial turmoil 
rapidly deepening, it has now become quite likely that the United States will face 
economic contraction in the period ahead and, on some accounts, it may even 
experience the most serious recession since the Great Depression despite 
expansionary monetary and fiscal measures.  There is no coordinated expansion by 
the G7 major industrial economies in sight.  Spillovers from this crisis to developing 
countries will certainly surpass the adverse international repercussions of crises in 
emerging markets in the 1990s.  However, for the first time in modern history, hopes 
seem to be largely pinned on developing countries, particularly in Asia, for sustaining 
stability and growth in the world economy.  On the one hand, the SWFs from 
                                                 
69 Such a regime was proposed in a paper jointly prepared by staff of the French and Japanese 
Ministries of Finance:  “A possible solution for many emerging market economies could be a managed 
floating exchange-rate regime whereby the currency moves within a given implicit or explicit band 
with its centre targeted to a basket of currencies. …managed free-floating exchange rate regimes may 
be accompanied for some time, in certain circumstances, by market-based regulatory measures to curb 
excessive capital inflows” (Ministry of Finance, Japan 2001: 3-4). 
  44emerging markets are increasingly looked at as stabilizing forces in financial markets 
by providing capital to support troubled banks in the United States and Europe.  On 
the other hand, economic prospects in the world economy seem to hinge, more than 
ever, on the ability of Asian developing countries to decouple their growth and 
continue surging ahead despite adverse spillovers from advanced countries.   
 
In Asia the impact of these spillovers will be felt at a time when the region is 
facing fragility and imbalances resulting from trade and financial policies and 
strategies pursued in recent years, including credit, asset and investment bubbles and 
excessive reliance on foreign markets.  However, economic fundamentals in the 
region are generally strong enough to allow a positive response to trade shocks from 
contraction of markets abroad and swings in exchange rates.  Countries with weak 
fiscal and current account positions look somewhat vulnerable to a sudden stop and 
reversal of capital flows, but this is not seen as likely to occur.  On balance, therefore, 
Asian developing countries can be expected to continue with rapid, albeit somewhat 
reduced, growth provided that they undertake counter-cyclical and structural measures 
needed to address domestic fragility and imbalances and counter the adverse effects of 
external shocks from the subprime crisis.   
 
Current conditions demonstrate once again that when policies falter in 
regulating financial institutions and markets, there is no limit to the damage that they 
can inflict on an economy. Furthermore, in a world of closely integrated markets, 
every major financial crisis has global repercussions. This means that shortcomings in 
national systems of financial rules and regulations are of international concern − more 
so for those in major advanced economies than in emerging markets because of their 
greater global repercussions. So far piecemeal initiatives and efforts in international 
fora such as the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial 
Stability Forum have not been able to prevent recurrence of virulent global financial 
crises. A fundamental collective rethinking with full participation of developing 
countries is thus needed for harnessing financial markets and reducing systemic and 
global instability. 
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Table 1:  United States household savings and indebtedness  
   (Per cent of disposable income) 
  1992  1996  1998  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
Savings 
 
7.7  4.0  4.3  2.3  2.4  2.1  2.1  0.5  0.4  0.7 
Liabilities 
 
87.2  95.0  97.1  102.7 112.1 120.2 126.8 134.4  138.1  … 
Mortgages 
 
62.3  63.8  64.9  68.5  78.4  85.7  92.2  100.2  103.1  … 
Debt as per cent 
of net worth 
 
























     _____________________ 
     Source:  OECD Economic Outlook (various issues) 





Table 2:  Private capital flows, current account balances and changes in reserves in emerging markets 
(Billions of US dollars) 
 
 




  2004  2005  2006  2007
e   2004  2005  2006  2007
e   2004  2005  2006  2007
e
Emerging markets    348.8 
 
519.6  572.8  620.3    150.2  274.1  380.2  419.5    398.2  442.2  554.0  756.2 
     Asia 
 
  165.6 
 
220.5  260.5  208.3    115.2  181.0  290.1  423.2    296.1  270.6  34.1  487.9 
     Latin  America    41.8 
 
70.0  52.6  106.0    22.3  41.1  51.6  26.5    22.5  29.7  50.3  95.2 
     Europe    131.1 
 
204.1  234.0  276.1    5.7  35.8  23.7  -45.6    60.8  116.5  128.9  137.7 
     Africa/Middle East 
 
  10.4 
 
25.0  25.8  29.8    6.9  4.0  5.5  6.4    18.7  25.5  33.7  35.3 
               −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−      
Source:  IIF (various issues) 
               e = estimate 
  
              Table 3:  Current account and reserves  


















  Source:  IMF  (2007b) 
a.  Cumulative current account balance over 2002-07. 
b.  Difference between increases in reserves and cumulative current account 
balance over 2002-07.    





Table 4: Growth estimates for 2007 and projections for 2008 
                             (Annual percentage change) 
 




   2007    
   2001 








  216.3 
1688.5  1343.2 
Current  account
a   
   2002-07 
   





   
   2002-07  620.7 
 




    2001 
    2007 
 
  4.9 
  8.8 
 
   6.6 
 12.8 




















IMF  (01.08) 
 
4.9  2.2  9.6    4.1  1.5  8.6 
WORLD BANK (01.08) 
 
3.6  2.2  10.0    3.3  1.9  9.7 
ADB  (03.08) 
 
- -   2.2  8.7    - -  1.5  7.6 
UN WESP (01.08) 












3.5  2.3  9.1    3.1  2.3  8.6 
  53